Aside: For a prior example of our Nash Eq. analysis...see here.
If we presume that each group had a bifurcated agenda that included only two items (1: end [or not] the Fed, and 2: raise [or not] taxes), we can create a simple game scenario to analyze the probable outcome of this hypothetical coordination. First, we must make some further assumptions as to the ordinal preferences of the two groups:
Assumed Preferences of player TEA (preferentially ranked by our subjective, empathy-based assessment)-
- End Fed / No Tax Raise = [TEA success / TEA success]
- No End Fed / No Tax Raise = [No TEA success / TEA success]
- End Fed / Raise Taxes = [TEA success / No TEA success]
- No End Fed / Raise Taxes = [No TEA success / No TEA success]
Assumed Preferences of player OWS (preferentially ranked by our subjective, empathy-based assessment)-
- End Fed / Raise Taxes = [OWS success / OWS success]
- No End Fed / Raise Taxes = [No OWS success / OWS success]
- End Fed / No Raise Taxes = [OWS success / No OWS success]
- No End Fed / No Raise Taxes = [No OWS success / No OWS success]
2*2*2 = 8 possible outcomes
When the analytical smoke clears, we find the Nash equilibrium (read: "most probable outcome, given the givens") to be the scenario where: 1) The Fed is ended, and 2) Taxes aren't raised...period.
Will any of this actually happen? Likely not, as our "leaders" (as they exist in their current form) will play OWS and TEA off of one another, sensing that strategic cooperation between the two groups might signal the terminal end of their own
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